The following is a report presented at the conference, “The Influence of the Constantinople Patriarchate on the Fate of Orthodoxy in Ukraine,” organized by the Center for Russian Studies at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Belgrade.
Metropolitan Luke (Kovalenko) of Zaporozhie and Melitopol. Photo: logoslovo.ru
The events related to the non-canonical interference of Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople and his Synod in the Ukrainian church crisis and the creation of the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” (OCU) are rightfully regarded by many Orthodox hierarchs and analysts as part of a larger project aimed at unifying the Christian world under the Vatican’s aegis with the participation of the Phanar. The efforts of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to promote the idea of “first without equals,” as well as the active ecumenical dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church, have led to significant changes in global Orthodoxy. In this context, the OCU project serves as a testing ground for refining methods and practices that disrupt the established order in relations between Local Orthodox Churches and skew the ecumenical dialogue. This report is dedicated to analyzing these processes, assessing their consequences, and exploring ways to protect the canonical order in the modern church situation.
In recent years, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew has actively promoted the concept of “first without equals,” which has raised many questions and concerns among other Local Orthodox Churches.
This concept grants the Patriarch of Constantinople a special status in the Orthodox world, implying not only primacy of honor but also primacy of authority. As a result of this positioning, Patriarch Bartholomew assumes powers not provided for by the canons or historical practice of Orthodoxy.
Promoting the Idea of His Primacy in the Orthodox East, the Phanar Seeks Closer Ties with the Vatican. Joint services and prayers between representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Roman Catholic Church have become commonplace. Notably, Patriarch Bartholomew himself has expressed a desire for unity with Catholics. For example, in 2021, during the feast of St. Andrew the First-Called in Istanbul, a Vatican delegation led by Cardinal Kurt Koch was present. In his sermon, Patriarch Bartholomew emphasized that his meetings with Pope Francis strengthen the desire for a “common Eucharistic chalice.” This indicates active attempts at rapprochement between the Phanar and the Roman Catholic Church. Similar statements have been reiterated, especially in anticipation of the 1700th anniversary of the First Ecumenical Council in 2025.
In this context, it is important to emphasize that the Unia (unification under Rome) has been repeatedly condemned by the Orthodox Church. As early as 2003, the global Orthodox Church, through the voices of the Primates of all Local Orthodox Churches, expressed a unified position regarding the Unia and the attempts to establish a Uniate Patriarchate in Ukraine. This response was given in a memorandum by Cardinal Walter Kasper, who, on behalf of the Apostolic See, addressed His Holiness Patriarch Alexiy II of Moscow and All Russia. After Patriarch Alexiy distributed the memorandum, the heads of the Local Churches sent their replies, including Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, who sent a special message to the Pope. In these messages, the Unia was called an ecclesiological heresy, with no right to exist in Christianity, and the creation of a Ukrainian Uniate Patriarchate was labeled a hostile and unfriendly step toward Orthodoxy. Furthermore, in the Joint Declaration signed by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia and Pope Francis during their Havana meeting in 2016, the methods of Uniatism and proselytism were deemed unacceptable.
Nevertheless, despite this united protest, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew continues to promote his ecclesiological concept of being “first without equals” and is laying the groundwork for a global union. It is already evident that this drive for unity will inevitably lead to profound changes in all aspects of Orthodox life, including the foundations of doctrine, liturgical practice, and canonical order. This is particularly significant in light of Pope Francis’s recent words on September 13, 2024, in Singapore, during a meeting with youth, which included representatives of five different religions. At this meeting, he stated that “all religions are a path to God.”
Using Ukraine as an example, the Phanar is implementing a strategy of union that may later be applied on a broader level. Its initial goal is to form a new union based on the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” (OCU) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). If this goal is achieved, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Vatican will use the “Ukrainian precedent” as proof that the reunification of Orthodox and Catholics without changing their doctrinal teachings is both achievable and realistic.
The creation of the OCU in 2018 and the granting of the Tomos of autocephaly marked the starting point for launching this corresponding experiment. This is evidenced by subsequent events in Ukraine that followed this destructive step by the Ecumenical Patriarch.
One of the key elements of this project has been the cooperation between the OCU and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC).
Since the “Euromaidan” and the events of 2014, joint prayers and actions between Dumenko’s structure (OCU) and the Uniates have become a regular occurrence in Ukraine. These joint actions are meant to show mass support and demonstrate the potential unification of the two confessions. However, it is clear that such initiatives are driven not by spiritual necessity but by political expediency and the desire to create an appearance of unity.
The head of the OCU, Epiphanius Dumenko, has repeatedly stated his desire to deepen relations with the UGCC, emphasizing that potential unification will depend on the global Orthodox-Catholic dialogue:
“This key (the key to uniting the two Ukrainian religious organizations—Metropolitan Luka) does not lie in Ukraine but in Rome and Constantinople, as it is there that ecumenical dialogues are taking place. In the future, our relations here in Ukraine will depend on this. But these relations are good, and I believe they will only improve in the future,” said the head of the OCU on September 12, 2019, during a meeting at the National University “Lviv Polytechnic.”
The presence of Catholics at the services of the “hierarchs” and “clergy” of the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” (OCU) directly illustrates the continued movement towards a union.
Another significant direction in expanding the “Overton window” in favor of Uniate interests has been the practical operation aimed at absorbing and “digesting” the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) into one of the parts that split from the “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church”—the “UAOC (o)” (formerly the Kharkov-Poltava diocese of the “UAOC”). This process was sanctioned and approved by the Vatican, which de facto created the first precedent in modern Ukrainian history for the transition of a religious structure, which had positioned itself as Orthodox, into a union with the Catholic Church. According to experts, this initiative should be viewed as a final trial run of technologies for integrating Ukrainian Orthodoxy into Catholic structures. It is also worth noting that the process of merging the “UAOC (o)” with the UGCC did not stop even after the creation of the OCU as a collection point for various organizations that had schismed from Orthodoxy. This once again highlights that the Uniates do not perceive the structure formed by the Phanar as a long-term, independent, or equal player in Ukraine’s religious landscape. Moreover, they are preparing another, significantly less meaningful, more thankless role for the OCU.
The characteristics and contours of this role can be judged from an interview given by the head of the UGCC, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, to the publication Obozrevatel, dated March 18, 2019.
First, the head of the Ukrainian Uniates noted that he received consent from the head of the OCU, Dumenko, to hold regular meetings where the prospects and parameters of rapprochement between the two structures would be discussed. Second, this process will take place within the framework of a roadmap agreed upon by both parties (with Shevchuk emphasizing that the UGCC already has such a roadmap, which could be modified according to the OCU’s vision; de facto, this means that the Uniates will make their own concept the basis for the corresponding union). Third, it becomes clear from Shevchuk’s interview that the UGCC intends to focus on a soft and gradual absorption of the OCU. In this regard, they plan to refrain from forming a joint structure for now and will instead emphasize restoring “Eucharistic communion” with the organization headed by Epiphany, enabling them to “celebrate the Divine Liturgy at the same altar.” Fourth, Shevchuk clearly indicated who he sees as the senior and who as the junior partner in the future tandem. He stated that, unlike the OCU, the UGCC is not a “local church” with parishes only in Ukraine. This, he argued, gives the Uniates the right not only to seek patriarchal status but also, as a “global church with de facto established structures of patriarchal governance,” to take on the spiritual care of the entire Ukrainian diaspora. Fifth, Shevchuk conspicuously avoided answering whether a potential union between the UGCC and the OCU would be a union of equals.
What is basically a swallowing up of the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” (OCU) by the Uniate Church will take place in a very delicate and almost invisible manner for the general public. As Shevchuk mentioned, the Uniates do not aim to create any joint megastructures with the OCU at the initial stage.
They are talking about the establishment of “Eucharistic communion and joint liturgical services,” which is the desired outcome for the Catholics. If the Uniates manage to convince the representatives of the OCU to serve together and, so to speak, “partake of the same chalice,” this would signify an acknowledgment of the spiritual authority of the Pope over Dumenko’s structure. After such an event, the schismatics will be only a small step away from fully entering the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC).
At a practical level, one of the most important mechanisms for advancing this process will be the ideological indoctrination of the “clergy” of the OCU, as well as the formation of a common “theological” foundation that justifies the new union. Supporting this conclusion are the words of Dumenko, which he uttered during a broadcast on the ICTV channel shortly after his election as the head of the new religious structure.
“We have outlined a certain path for our future cooperation (with the UGCC), and in the future, we will look for those points of contact that will unite us. This includes the area of spiritual education and other aspects of our existence,” the head of the OCU said at the time.
Attention should also be drawn to the recently announced decision for a joint celebration of Pascha in 2025, which was voiced at the Synaxis of hierarchs of the Ecumenical Throne. According to Romfea, in May 2025, an official celebration of the 1700th anniversary of the First Ecumenical Council will be held in Nicaea (Bithynia) with the participation of Pope Francis. The press service of the Ecumenical Patriarchate stated that during the Synaxis, a desire was expressed for Eastern and Western Christianity to celebrate Pascha together. This is intended to be the beginning of establishing a common date for its celebration each year. Such a step underscores the Phanar’s intention to move toward union with Rome.
In this context, it is important to understand the interest of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in establishing unity with Rome.
As noted by Kyriakos Kyriakopoulos, a professor of ecclesiastical law at the Faculty of Law of Aristotle University in Thessaloniki, the Vatican’s goal in the ecumenical dialogue with the Phanar is to transform the Autocephalous Local Orthodox Churches into Uniate ones. The Papal See aims for the “Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches,” issued in 1990 by Pope John Paul II, to be applied to all Orthodox Churches. This document contains dogmatic rules that impose the pontiff as the leader with primacy of authority.
The implementation of such a plan is only possible if Patriarch Bartholomew becomes, in effect, an “Eastern Pope,” capable of single-handedly managing the entire Orthodox world and imposing decisions favorable to the Roman Catholic Church (RCC). It is precisely this immense power, recognized by the Vatican, that the head of the Phanar seeks, destroying Church conciliarity on his path to it, legalizing schismatic structures, and weakening those Orthodox Churches that stand against the widespread transformation of Orthodoxy into Uniatism.
The processes initiated by Patriarch Bartholomew have already led to the destruction of pan-Orthodox unity and deep divisions within the Orthodox world. Today, we are witnessing the formation of a new model of global Orthodoxy, where the Ecumenical Patriarch occupies a central position with unprecedented powers and privileges. This changes the very nature of the Orthodox Church’s structure and contradicts the conciliar principle that lies at the heart of the Orthodox Church.
The main target is the Russian Church and the Churches of the Balkan region, which are the strongest opponents of uniatism and the power ambitions of the Phanar. These ambitions introduce [into the Orthodox world] “the smoky arrogance of this world,” as the Fathers of Carthage once wrote to Pope Celestine. The goal of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is to weaken these Churches by fragmenting and isolating them on the international level (this process can already be observed in the Baltic region).
Ukraine serves as the primary pilot project in this strategy. The next targets may include Moldova, Belarus, and the canonical territory of the Serbian Church, where plans are being made to create separate “churches” modeled after the OCU (a “parade of autocephalies”).
In this context, I would like to draw special attention to the support that the UGCC and the Phanar provide to the head of the Montenegrin schismatic structure, Boris Bojović.
The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) facilitated his legalization by inviting the leader of the “CPC” to the conference, “Together Through Hard Times of War: The Experience of Post-Yugoslav Countries and Ukraine” (Lvov, April 17–18, 2024).
Later, the Uniates gave Bojović a platform through their news portal, RISU. In an interview with this outlet, the Montenegrin “hierarch” stated that his structure hopes to receive a Tomos of autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. He also noted that his organization maintains close contact with the Phanar, which, according to him, sent observers “to study the internal organization” of the so-called Montenegrin Orthodox Church.
The problem is that in 2019, in an interview with the Serbian publication Kurir, the head of the Phanar assured that he would never grant autocephaly to the “false” so-called Montenegrin Orthodox Church. When asked directly whether autocephaly might be possible if someone other than Mihailo Dedeić headed the “CPC,” he categorically replied: “No, no, and no! The Church in Montenegro is the Serbian Orthodox Church, and no changes will ever occur there.”
Yet, after a few years, certain “contacts” with Montenegrin schismatics have emerged. Once again, the Phanar has demonstrated that its words and statements cannot be trusted.
This is similar to the case with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), where Patriarch Bartholomew repeatedly asserted that he recognized Metropolitan Onufriy as the only canonical head of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, only to later invade foreign canonical territory [Ukraine] and grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian schismatics.
Who can guarantee that he will not do the same later with the Serbian Orthodox Church? In the Ukrainian scenario, representatives of the “UOC-KP” also maintained informal contacts with the Phanar for many years and eventually achieved their goal when the political climate changed. The contradiction between Bartholomew’s public statements and his actions was obscured by a stream of cunning, deceitful arguments.
Given this, the readiness of the Local Churches to defend the purity of the faith and the canonical order becomes of paramount importance. The conciliar wisdom of the Universal Church must evaluate the actions of the Phanar with regards to the promotion of the “first without equals” concept and the movement toward union with the Vatican. These actions go beyond jurisdictional disputes, and require deep reflection and discussion at the pan-Orthodox level.
Considering the current situation, I propose several pan-Orthodox measures for discussion to protect the unity, canonical order, and doctrinal purity of Orthodoxy:
1. Strengthening the “Amman Format”: The Amman meeting, initiated by the Jerusalem Patriarchate, was one of the first steps towards addressing the ongoing crisis in the Orthodox Church. This format could be developed as a permanent platform for dialogue and exchange of opinions between the Local Churches. Regular meetings within this framework would help to develop a common vision and mechanisms to protect the canonical order, as well as prevent future schisms.
If it is challenging at this stage to ensure direct communication between the Primates of the Local Churches, it may be worthwhile to consider other options for establishing and maintaining consistent communication. For example, a format could be explored of systematic meetings between trusted representatives of the Church Primates, who would be authorized to speak on their behalf and hold significant powers.
2. Holding theological dialogues and consiliums: Discussing theological issues related to canons, ecclesiology, primacy, and conciliarity plays an important role in preserving unity. Organizing theological commissions, which would include representatives from different Local Churches (such as those participating in the “Amman Format”) and prepare positions on sensitive issues for meetings of the Church Primates, would allow for deeper exploration of existing problems and the formulation of well-argued responses to theological challenges. One area of such work could be the analysis and pan-Orthodox discussion of the Russian Orthodox Church’s document, “On the Distortion of Orthodox Teaching on the Church in the Actions of the Hierarchy of the Constantinople Patriarchate and the Statements of Its Representatives.”
3. Strengthening the role of Local Councils: Local Orthodox Churches can convene their own Councils to develop unified positions on key issues of canonical order and relationships with other Local Churches. The recommendations and decisions of such Councils could then be presented for wider pan-Orthodox discussion.
4. Universal condemnation of schismatic actions: Local Churches must unite in a collective stand against canonical violations and schismatic actions, publicly condemning them. This will help prevent the spread of false teachings and maintain church order.
5. Cooperation between laity and clergy: We need to strengthen connections within the Church, involving both clergy and laity in discussions of complex issues. An intra-church dialogue can help develop a unified stance on issues of our times, and reinforce internal unity. In this context, church preaching, education, and clarification of key issues related to canonical order and ecclesiology to the faithful play a vital role.
6. Resistance to external pressure: Local Churches must unite to protect themselves from external interference, whether it comes in the form of political pressure, actions by radical groups, or ecumenical initiatives that undermine doctrinal foundations and violate canonical order. Church diplomacy on the international level should also be strengthened to safeguard the Church’s interests and traditions
7. A unified information space: The creation of a unified, pan-Orthodox information space, which communicates and explains the positions of the Local Churches on contentious issues, is an important tool for countering disinformation and manipulation. Official church media and online platforms can help inform the faithful about the Church’s positions, strengthening its authority. Moreover, the creation of a common informational resource could be considered, presenting the positions of Local Churches on significant pan-Orthodox issues, highlighting key events in the life of the Churches, and facilitating direct dialogue between theological and expert circles of the Local Churches on topics of mutual interest (in the format of an “Amman expert forum”).
Developing these pathways and adhering to them, I believe, will allow the Orthodox Church to preserve its unity and identity, while also adequately responding to the challenges of modernity.
